Standing Committee D

[Mr. Win Griffiths in the Chair]

Public Audit (Wales) Bill [Lords]

Don Touhig: I beg to move,
 That the Public Audit (Wales) Bill [Lords] be considered in the following order: Clauses 1 to 50, Schedule 1, Clauses 51 to 66, Schedule 2, Clauses 67 and 68, Schedule 3, Clauses 69 to 72, Schedule 4, Clauses 73 to 75, New Clauses, New Schedules, remaining proceedings on the Bill.
 We have had a meeting of the Programming Sub-Committee, and it agreed to the motion. I am pleased that you are in the Chair, Mr. Griffiths; I have been fortunate enough in my time as a Minister to serve on several Committees that you have chaired. Some have considered important legislation for Wales, and your knowledge and insight about Wales, as a Welsh MP and former Welsh Office Minister, have been invaluable. We are fortunate that you are chairing the Committee, because your help, advice, humour and patience will greatly aid our scrutiny of this important legislation. I have no doubt that we will make good progress in debating the Bill, and we will look to you for guidance and help to get through it as expeditiously as possible.

Bill Wiggin: I echo the Minister's kind comments, because he is absolutely right. I hope that he will continue to be kind and generous with his comments throughout our debates. His important point was about what a tremendous Chairman we have in you, Mr. Griffiths, and how lucky we have been to have you chairing our debates not only on various pieces of Welsh legislation, but in the Welsh Grand Committee, where you have guided us wisely. We are delighted to have you with us this morning.

Roger Williams: Good morning, Mr. Griffiths. Thank you for chairing this Standing Committee, and as previous speakers have said, we look forward to your guidance. As Wales is such a busy place, some of us will be darting back and forth between this Committee and the Welsh Affairs Committee, so I offer my apologies for that.
 Question put and agreed to.

Win Griffiths: Before we start debating the Bill, I remind the Committee that there is a money resolution in connection with the Bill, and copies of the resolution are available in the Room. I also remind Members that adequate notice should be given of any amendments. As a general rule, I do not intend to call starred
 amendments, including starred amendments that may be reached during an afternoon sitting of the Committee.

Clause 1 - Transfer of functions of Assembly

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 1, in page 1, line 7, leave out from 'may' to second 'the' and insert 'after consultation with'.

Win Griffiths: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 2, in clause 1, page 1, line 15, leave out paragraph (a).

Bill Wiggin: Amendment No. 1 is a probing amendment to clarify the relationship between the Auditor General and the Assembly, and what would happen if the Auditor General did not agree with the Assembly. I seek an assurance from the Minister that the procedure in the event of a disagreement is robust. The wording that the Assembly should seek the consent of the Auditor General implies that the Auditor General is superior and has the power to refuse consent. The amendment is designed to find out whether that is the intention. We believe that the word ''consultation'' allows for a more open procedure on a more equal footing, meaning that disagreements would not cause any problems.
 Amendment No. 2 would leave out subsection (2)(a), because its definition of the public body as 
''exercising functions of a public nature'' 
is too imprecise. We are concerned that the definition could include a private sector company performing public works as a contractor, such as a road builder. Does paragraph (a) mean that the Auditor General could look into the affairs of private companies? There are many small organisations funded substantially through commercial contracts with the public sector, but there is no exemption for them. It is important that public money is properly audited, but I am concerned that small enterprises substantially funded in that way could fall under the provision.

Don Touhig: The clause requires that the Assembly obtain the consent of the Auditor General before making an order. Amendment No. 1 would remove the requirement to obtain the Auditor General's consent before the Assembly could make an order enabling him to exercise certain of the Assembly's supervisory functions. The amendment provides for consultation with the Auditor General, but falls short of seeking his or her consent. It could mean, therefore, that the Assembly could impose the exercise of functions on the Auditor General. That would be unacceptable, and I will explain why.
 The consent of the Auditor General to any exercise of the Assembly's functions provided for by the clause is vital, because the Auditor General is a Crown appointment. As the statutory auditor of the Assembly, it is important that his independence is not called into question. That is the main reason why we will resist the amendment. The Auditor General must 
 be satisfied that in taking on any such functions his independence is not compromised. Objectivity and independence are the two key principles underlying the auditor's work. They are promoted by the auditing practices board and observed by the Auditor General. The requirement for his consent in clause 1 ensures that those safeguards are maintained. 
 A further safeguard is that any order made under the clause, whether transferring supervisory functions on a once-and-for-all basis or asking the Auditor General to exercise them on the Assembly's behalf, would be subject to scrutiny under the National Assembly's subordinate legislation procedures. Those of us who have served on Committees dealing with Welsh legislation—as the hon. Member for Leominster (Mr. Wiggin) has—will recognise that the Assembly has rigorous public scrutiny of such matters. 
 The basic objective of the provision is to reduce bureaucracy where possible. Discussions between the Auditor General and the Assembly on the issue need not be confrontational, and I hope that they would not be. The Assembly would readily accept the fact that the Auditor General might consider it inappropriate to take on a particular function. 
 Amendment No. 2 would restrict the Assembly's ability to transfer supervisory functions to the Auditor General or to have him exercise such functions on the Assembly's behalf. The effect would be that the Assembly could not exercise that power in respect of a body that exercises functions of a public nature but is not entirely or substantially funded from public money. That is an unnecessary restriction and could be counter-productive. A body exercising functions of a public nature may not be entirely funded from public money, nor need it necessarily be construed as being substantially funded from public money. It may earn income from fees and charges. 
 I shall give some examples to assist the Committee. If such a body is a regulatory body, it may derive a significant proportion of its income from inspection or registration fees. Two examples of that would be the Care Council for Wales and the General Teaching Council for Wales. The reasons why the Assembly may wish to transfer its supervisory functions—or to have them exercised by the Auditor General—may be valid irrespective of whether a body is wholly or partly financed from public funds. 
 The definition of a ''public body'' in the clause is consistent with the definition used in the Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000. If there was doubt about whether a body was ''substantially'' funded from public money, it might still be covered under the first heading of the definition as a body exercising functions of a public nature. The alternatives—to define ''substantial'' in terms of a cash or percentage threshold—could result in anomalies. The Assembly could make such an order only in relation to the supervisory functions that it already has, so the regulatory burden on bodies that fall within the definition would not be increased. 
 The hon. Member for Leominster asked whether the definition of a public body in the clause could cover private companies. The Auditor General would not 
 exercise functions in respect of a private contractor; those would be carried out under the terms and conditions of the contract, and not by the statutory supervisory responsibility of the Auditor General. I hope that my explanation has been helpful, and I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

Hywel Williams: It is vital that the Auditor General's independence is not compromised. It is also vital that he should be satisfied that, in assuming his functions, his independence is not compromised. The requirement for his consent in clause 1 is a safeguard in that respect, and we support the Minister's request for the amendment to be withdrawn.

Bill Wiggin: If we are going to get through all the amendments at this speed, I shall be happy, and I am delighted that the Minister's answers were so helpful. Unusual though it may be for me to be batting for equality with the Assembly, I am delighted that the Crown appointment is a superior appointment, so the Auditor General must give consent and consultation is not necessary. I am extremely grateful to the Minister for clarifying the nature of a publicly funded or substantially publicly funded public body, and for ruling out the possibility of private companies being within the remit. Having been satisfied on my two key concerns, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2 - Additional functions of Auditor General

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 4, in page 2, line 41, leave out from 'must' to end of line.

Win Griffiths: With this we may discuss the following amendments: No. 5, in clause 2, page 3, leave out lines 33 to 39.
 No. 6, in clause 2, page 3, line 39, at end insert— 
 '(3A) Arrangements may not be made under subsections (1) or (3) unless the Auditor General for Wales has satisfied himself that the independence of any audit carried out by him or by a person appointed by him is not impaired by the arrangements.'.

Bill Wiggin: Amendment No. 4 would delete the words
''if so required by a relevant body'' 
from proposed new section 96B(1) of the Government of Wales Act 1998, which clause 2 inserts, because they imply that certification is optional. Certification is an important process, which should be an integral part of the Auditor General's duty, but the Bill allows a relevant body to request the Auditor General to certify. We are concerned that the clause allows bodies to shop around for certification of their claims, which is an undesirable practice. 
 Amendment No. 5 would leave out new section 96C(3) as inserted by clause 2. It is a probing amendment to find out what arrangements will be made between the Auditor General and the three types 
 of organisation set out in the subsection—a ''relevant authority'', a ''qualified auditor'' and an ''accountancy body''. What arrangements might be made with each type of organisation, and will the Minister confirm which bodies are covered by subsections (1) and (3)? 
 Amendment No. 6 deals with the Auditor General's independence. Our suggested new subsection would ensure that his independence was not impaired by arrangements that he made with the various bodies for the various purposes in subsections (1) to (3). Maintaining the same standards of auditor independence in the public sector as exist in the private sector is vital. The amendment would give the Auditor General a clear obligation to satisfy himself that the arrangements entered into did not weaken his independence. That statutory requirement would provide firm roots for both actual and perceived independence. 
 In Committee in the other place, Lord Davies argued that the Government do not believe that a statutory duty is necessary to ensure that the Auditor General upholds the highest standard of independence. As the proposed duty would support what will be the outcome anyway, the amendment would do no harm. In fact, it would strengthen high-quality public audit to have the same firm guidelines and protocols as the private sector has.

Don Touhig: The provision in clause 2 that inserts new section 96B into the 1998 Act is intended to make it clear that the Auditor General is required, on request, to make arrangements for the certification of claims and returns or accounts relating to public bodies for which he has a statutory audit responsibility. At present, there is a mandatory requirement for certification, about which the hon. Member for Leominster has sought reassurance. However, bodies have discretion in respect of the people whom they ask to carry out the certification. In practice, the great majority of bodies ask their appointed auditor or a statutory auditor to undertake such work.
 The strong likelihood is that public bodies covered by new section 96B will request the Auditor General to arrange certification work under the arrangements in the Bill. The clause gives them the security of knowing that if they ask him to make arrangements he must comply—for instance, if they are having difficulty in obtaining certification services from another source. 
 Giving the Auditor General a monopoly of such certifications would not be appropriate. Retaining a measure of discretion, as proposed new section 96B would, gives bodies an element of choice—the in word of the moment—in certifying work, and could alleviate the work pressures that the Auditor General's office might face. 
 The key safeguard is that any shortcomings in certification work arising from the use of an auditor other than the Auditor General, or one with whom he makes arrangements, would be identified during the statutory audit of that body's accounts by the Auditor General, or, in the case of local government, by the 
 appointed auditor. Claims and returns in respect of European Community grant schemes are examples of such certification work. 
 Amendment No. 4 would also require the Auditor General to make arrangements for the certification of claims, returns or accounts relating to bodies for which he has no statutory audit responsibility. The fact that he would be required to perform those functions irrespective of his wider audit relationship with a body could result in his undertaking such work in a vacuum, without any background knowledge of what he is to certify, for whom and why. 
 Amendment No. 5 could prevent the Auditor General from making arrangements with other regulatory and audit bodies for co-operation and mutual assistance that would be beneficial to the exercise of their respective functions. It could also hamper his ability to participate in joint working and co-operation. Hon. Members will be aware that the Welsh Affairs Committee endorsed the objective of wide powers of co-operation. 
 The Committee also welcomed the case for a public mechanism to ensure that the benefits of the growing diversity of provisions among the nations of the UK are realised. The clause furthers that aim. A key principle of the Bill is to ensure that there is greater collaborative working through joint reviews, and strategic forward planning between audit and regulatory bodies—including bodies from elsewhere in the UK, such as Audit Scotland—and from outside the UK. Increased collaborative working would also reduce the administrative burden on client organisations. 
 Examples of work that could be undertaken under the provision are as follows: joint review work between the Auditor General on an England and Wales basis, or a wider UK or international basis; the secondment of staff between the proposed Wales Audit Office and other bodies covered by the clause for training or specific work-related reasons; the provision of specific expertise by one body to another, such as specialist forensic accounting services and the interrogation of complex databases; and international co-operation in developing audit standards and financial accountability, which would be valuable because risk management structures may also affect European audit bodies. 
 I mentioned in my opening speech on Second Reading that the Auditor General and his staff would have much to contribute. The Auditor General, by virtue of his office, may have implied power to enter into arrangements, but without the provision, each of the categories of body referred to would have to consider whether its powers were sufficiently wide to enable it to enter into such an arrangement. The key objective of the clause is to make clear the powers of all prospective parties to enter into such arrangements. International audit offices equivalent to the Auditor General for Wales would be covered by the definition of ''relevant authority'' in the clause. 
 Amendment No. 6 would require the Auditor General to satisfy himself that his independence in conducting audits was not impaired as a result of his 
 entering into co-operative arrangements, including arrangements with the National Assembly. We touched on the imperative for the Auditor General to maintain his independence, and he already abides by the auditing practices board's guidance on standards of independence. Objectivity and independence are two of the key ethical principles that govern auditors' professional responsibilities. 
 The independence of public sector auditors from the organisation that is being audited is also a fundamental principle adopted by the Public Audit Forum, which comprises the principal audit bodies for the four home nations. The auditing practices board is in advanced stages of discussion with the national audit agencies, which include the Auditor General for Wales, on the adoption of ethical standards that the board proposes to introduce later this year. 
 Agreement is a matter for the audit agencies and the board, but the Government believe that it is appropriate for common standards to apply across the audit profession and we would welcome such an agreement. I am confident that agreement can be reached and that standards will be adopted, particularly given the Auditor General's adherence to the existing auditing practices board guidance. 
 The Auditor General also has in place local protocols that ensure independence and guard against conflicts of interest arising. For example, in the case of the secondment of national audit staff to a client organisation, those members of staff, on returning to the National Audit Office, do not perform any audit functions in respect of that body for three years. It will be open to the Auditor General to reconsider existing arrangements, strengthening them if he considers it necessary. For that reason, I do not believe that a statutory duty is necessary to ensure that the Auditor General upholds the highest standards of independence. 
 The hon. Member for Leominster asked what is covered by subsections (1) and (3). A relevant authority can mean a Department, a local authority, an Assembly-sponsored public body or the holder of a public office such as the Children's Commissioner. 
 In respect of amendment No. 4 and clause 2, the hon. Gentleman asked about the implication that certification is optional and what arrangements are to be made with other bodies to avoid that. The provision does not affect whether the body in question must seek certification in particular circumstances; it simply means that where that body requires the Auditor General to do the certification work, he must do so. The provision is equivalent to the position under the Audit Commission Act 1998 that applies in England and Wales. When making grants and so on, the Assembly and its sponsored bodies would include specific provision in grant conditions to ensure that certification is done by the Auditor General. 
 Given that clarification, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Bill Wiggin: I have been most remiss in not thanking colleagues in another place, especially Lord Roberts of Conwy and Baroness Noakes, both of whom did a fantastic job in scrutinising the Bill. Even if I did not like the Minister's response, I am reminded of the Greeks at Thermopylae in that numbers on the Opposition side of the Committee are reduced compared with the hordes on the Government side. I looked around for potential allies, but the Liberal Democrats are not present. According to the Flint and Holywell Chronicle, that is because they have already won:
 ''Delyn Liberal Democrats are celebrating victory over controversial plans to gag Welsh whistle-blowers. The Government is to shelve plans to fine or imprison ''whistle-blowing'' Welsh auditors who leak information about improper behaviour by local authorities. Liberal Democrat peers, MPs and Ams, with support from other opposition parties, vigorously fought the proposal contained in the Public Audit (Wales) Bill now before Parliament.'' 
However, the Liberal Democrats are not here. The quote continues: 
 ''Now the Government has relented and plans to drop the proposals. During a House of Commons debate, Liberal MP Lembit Opik acknowledged the part played by Delyn Lib Dems in opposing the gagging of whistle-blowers. Delyn Lib Dem vice-chairman Cllr Robin Baker has welcomed the Government climbdown and says the decision reaffirmed his belief in the democratic process in Wales and the UK as a whole.'' 
 [Interruption.] I can see that Labour Members are delighted with that recognition.

Win Griffiths: Order. I am waiting to see which of the hon. Gentleman's amendments this relates to.

Bill Wiggin: Amendment No. 4. I am grateful for your sharp intervention, Mr. Griffiths. I shall stop tormenting the absent Liberal Democrats about their hypocrisy; as they are not here to fight back, perhaps your plea for clemency should be borne in mind.
 The important point is that it is clear from the Minister's reply that certification is not questioned in the way that it could have been. It allows bodies to shop around, but the important point that he made is that the Auditor General must not certify bodies with which he has no link. I am grateful for that reply. The idea that he would have too much work is not one that I take on board, although he should not be working in a vacuum, as the Minister described it. I am also grateful to him for describing the local protocols, and I am happy that that answers some of my concerns about amendment No. 5. 
 Turning to amendment No. 6, which would ensure that arrangements 
''may not be made under subsections (1) or (3) unless the Auditor General for Wales has satisfied himself that the independence of any audit carried out by him or by a person appointed by him is not impaired by the arrangements'', 
obviously the Auditor General must be satisfied that his independence is maintained. From the comments that are now on the record, any doubts about that will be allayed. 
 I am grateful to the Minister for his replies, although I am not particularly grateful to the Liberal Democrats for not turning up, but as one can tell from their press releases, they think that they have already done their 
 job. I am sure that the electorate will hold them to account at the next election. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3 - Studies for improving economy etc in services

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 7, in clause 3, page 4, leave out lines 25 and 26.
 Subsection (3) prevents the Auditor General from questioning the merits of the policy objectives of a body as he studies value for money. If in the course of his studies, the Auditor General discovers a body's objectives to be causing inefficiency and ineffectiveness, he should report and question its policy. However, subsection (3) discourages him from making such comments. The amendment would ensure that he is not constrained in his work by policy considerations.

Hywel Williams: From the Government's standpoint, it may well be beneficial for the Auditor General not to question the merits of policy objectives. In practice, however, I do not see how that can be avoided if in the course of his work he discovers that a body's objectives do not contribute to efficiency or effectiveness.
 That by no means confirms that the amendment is correct, but one point concerns me and my party—the relationship between the Audit Committee of the National Assembly, and the Government and the Auditor General. There is a good working relationship, which, in the Assembly, is based on the Audit Committee being precluded from scrutinising the policy implications of its reports. That, in respect of the clause, fits in with the role of the Auditor General.

Don Touhig: We have had a short but important debate that perhaps goes to one of the big issues that have faced auditing and public inspection these past years. Amendment No. 7 would delete the prohibition on the Auditor General being able to question the merits of policy objectives of any relevant body while undertaking or promoting comparative cost-cutting studies on economy, efficiency and effectiveness—or, as most of us know it, value for money.
 It is a long-standing principle that the Auditor General, and similarly the Comptroller and Auditor General in England, cannot question the policy objectives of a body for which he has audit responsibilities. That does not prevent him from expressing a view on how the body set about achieving its objectives and whether its approach represents value for money. He may also, as the clause seeks to promote, inform future strategic policy development. We touched on that on Second Reading. 
 However, questioning the merits of policy could compromise the Auditor General's independence if, for instance, he undertook audit work or a ''value for money'' study relating to a policy area on which he had previously expressed a view. That would not be conducive to the exercise of his functions, and we fear that it might be seen as a blight on his independence. 
 The amendment would also raise an inconsistency between the Auditor General's powers in respect of cross-cutting studies provided for under the clause, and studies in respect of the Assembly and Assembly-funded bodies undertaken under the Government of Wales Act 1998, where the prohibition on questioning policy merits would still apply. For those reasons, we believe it would be inappropriate for the Auditor General to question the merits of policy objectives when exercising his functions.

Bill Wiggin: I am particularly keen to intervene on the Minister because I do not want him to finish before having the chance to consider this. We all recognise the importance of an expert being able to comment, but quite a harsh turn of phrase is used to prevent the Auditor General from commenting. Surely, in the interests of effectiveness and efficiency, he ought at least to be able to say something that would be helpful. I am prepared to recognise that simply deleting the wording is not the best solution, but might not some modification be possible to enable him to make a constructive input without impinging on his independence?

Don Touhig: The hon. Gentleman makes a perfectly valid point. In my initial comments, I sought to point out that the Auditor General has the ability to question the merits of policy and how an operation is being worked. He may express a view on how a body sets about exercising its objective and whether its approach represents value for money. We are at one on that. I will take the hon. Gentleman's point on board and reflect further on the wording, although I do not know whether it will be possible or appropriate to make any changes.
 The hon. Member for Caernarfon (Hywel Williams) makes an important point. I am aware of the good relationship in the National Assembly in respect of the work of the Audit Committee. Again, I will broadly reflect on the provisions of the clause. If the Government feel that there is anything that we could or should do to take account of the points made by both hon. Gentlemen, we will perhaps reconsider at a later stage.

Bill Wiggin: I am grateful to the Minister for those comments. I know now that the Official Report of this Committee plays a part in any legal questioning. His answer enables us to withdraw the amendment because we now know that should the Auditor General wish to make a comment he can do so. That was the
 purpose behind the amendment. I am happy with the Minister's reply and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Hywel Williams: May I draw the Committee's attention to the need to keep the Assembly's Audit Committee informed of and involved in these studies? I note the Minister's confirmation that he will take this point into account. Section 145 of the Government of Wales Act states that the views of the Audit Committee should be taken into account, yet there is no such statement in proposed new section 145A. However, I take his point that the importance of the Audit Committee will be borne in mind.

Don Touhig: The hon. Gentleman is right. Sections 100 and 145 of the Government of Wales Act enable the Auditor General to undertake value-for-money studies in respect of the National Assembly or its sponsored bodies. When undertaking such studies, the Auditor General must take account of the views of the National Assembly's Audit Committee.
 Clause 3 adds proposed new section 145A to the Government of Wales Act, which enables the Auditor General to undertake forward-looking cross-sectional value-for-money studies. The clause does not specifically state that the Auditor General will take account of the Audit Committee's views, although, in practice, I believe he would. As I said earlier, I will take account of what the hon. Gentleman says, and if there is anything we ought to do to make that point clearer, we will consider it. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4 - Studies at request of educational bodies

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 9, in page 5, line 12, leave out from 'Table' to end of line 14.

Win Griffiths: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
 No. 10, in clause 4, page 5, line 14, at end insert 
'or if he considers it appropriate to do so'. 
No. 12, in clause 4, page 5, line 42, at end insert— 
'(aa) be appointed to audit their accounts;'. 
No. 13, in clause 4, page 6, line 3, at end insert— 
'(c) provided that any such member of staff is eligible for appointment within the terms of section 14'. 
No. 11, in clause 4, page 6, leave out lines 12 and 13.

Bill Wiggin: The amendments relate to value-for-money studies of educational bodies and the audit aspect of clause 4. We welcome value-for-money studies being carried out by the Auditor General in educational bodies, but they can be carried out only at the request of the educational body. That places
 educational bodies in a position totally different from that of the bodies covered by clause 3, which the Auditor General can study at will. Why is there special treatment for educational institutions?
 Amendments Nos. 9 and 10 would remove the need for consent. Amendment No. 10 offers an alternative to amendment No. 9 by adding at the end of line 14 
''or if he considers it appropriate to do so.''
 That would give the Auditor General back his power to initiate studies rather than rely solely on the consent of educational bodies. We do not believe that the initiative for studies should be left to the bodies themselves. Amendments Nos. 9 and 10 are probing amendments designed to ask the Minister to explain why these bodies are allowed to request value-for-money studies. They receive large amounts of public money, so it is important that the value for money of those funds is studied. 
 Amendment No. 11 is a probing amendment to discover whether the clause is drafted to be consistent with past legislation relating to educational bodies, and I hope that the Minister will explain subsection (7). If we simply allowed educational bodies to request to be studied, it would not be surprising if they did not choose to volunteer for scrutiny if there was any doubt whether all was well. The Auditor General's powers to study relevant bodies in clause 3 should apply to educational bodies. He should not have to depend on bodies requesting him to initiate studies. The Bill puts education authorities in a more protected position, so in that area the Bill fails to provide strong provision for public audit in Wales. 
 Amendments Nos. 12 and 13 concern the audit aspect of clause 4. In proposed section 145B(5), the Auditor General can advise higher and further education corporations on the appointment of auditors, or arrange for a member of his staff to be appointed auditor, but he himself cannot be appointed auditor. Amendment No. 12 would rectify that omission. Proposed new subsection (5) would allow the Auditor General to appoint a member of his staff as auditor to a higher or further education establishment. Amendment No. 13 merely seeks to ensure that the member of staff is qualified properly, in line with the qualification specified in clause 14. 
 We worry about the coherence of the Bill. Baroness Noakes described it in another place as 
''a patchwork of different provisions culled from here, there and everywhere.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 23 February 2004; Vol. 658, c. GC25.] 
I hope that the Minister will take the opportunity to consider the amendments, which would ensure that the Bill did not prescribe different standards.

Don Touhig: Amendments Nos. 9 and 10 would enable the Auditor General to undertake value-for-money studies of individual educational bodies in Wales, irrespective of whether they had been requested. You will recall, Mr. Griffiths, the case of a college in Gwent for which Members of Parliament played a significant role in getting an audit and investigation, and I have background knowledge of how such arrangements work in practice.
 The intention of clause 4 is to enable the Auditor General to undertake studies of bodies, such as higher or further education colleges, at the request of the governing body or the funding agency. The relevant funding agencies in Wales are the National Council for Education and Training for Wales and the Higher Education Funding Council. The Audit Commission currently has the power in respect of England and Wales under the Audit Commission Act 1998. 
 It is appropriate that such studies should be undertaken only on request. The Auditor General is not the statutory auditor of such education bodies; they are responsible for the appointment of their own auditors—that is the distinction. However, the amendments would give the Auditor General complete discretion to undertake such studies, irrespective of whether they were requested, and of the fact that he would have no wider statutory audit functions in respect of those bodies. 
 The Auditor General already has the ability under section 145 of the Government of Wales Act 1998 to undertake economy, efficiency and effectiveness studies in the higher and further education sectors, which can touch on and compare the practices of individual institutions in using resources. 
 The National Council for Education and Training for Wales and the Higher Education Funding Council, to which I have referred, are Assembly-sponsored bodies, and the Auditor General for Wales is their statutory auditor. On publication of the draft Bill for consultation in April last year, the Assembly undertook that if at some point in the future it were to propose to incorporate further or higher education corporations as a category within the Auditor General's remit, such a proposal would be subject to a separate consultation exercise—an important safeguard. It would be preferable to deal with such bodies as a class rather than on a piecemeal basis. 
 Any future exercise could take account of arrangements for both financial audit and value-for-money audit through economy, efficiency and effectiveness studies. Nothing in proposed new section 145B(5) of the Government of Wales Act prevents the Auditor General and an education body from renewing an audit arrangement for a further financial year. It would be incongruous and would lead to confusion over the respective roles of the Auditor General and an educational institution's own auditor if the former could undertake unsolicited value-for-money studies. 
 Amendment No. 12 would enable the Auditor General to be appointed as the statutory auditor of an education corporation on a permanent basis. Clause 4 will add a new section 145B(5) to the Government of Wales Act to enable the Auditor General, at the request of a higher or further education corporation, both to advise them in connection with the appointment of persons to audit their accounts and to arrange for their accounts for a financial year to be audited by one or more members of his staff, appointed by the corporation. 
 If a corporation were experiencing difficulties, for whatever reason, in acquiring audit, they could call on the Auditor General for assistance. I have already referred to the National Assembly's undertaking to consult on any future proposal to incorporate further and higher education corporations as a class within the Auditor General's remit. Any such proposal would take account of both financial audit and value-for-money work. 
 Against that background, the amendment would create an unnecessarily piecemeal approach to the financial audit of higher and further education corporations and would run counter to the National Assembly's commitment to consult on any future proposed change to the audit arrangement for such bodies. In conjunction with section 144 of the Government of Wales Act, clause 63 would enable further and higher education institutions to be added to the Auditor General's remit at some point in the future. 
 Amendment No. 13 would require that any member of staff appointed to audit the accounts of an education corporation by the Auditor General must be eligible for appointment under clause 14. However, that clause relates specifically to the appointment of auditors by the Auditor General for local government bodies. Higher and further education corporations do not fall within the category of local government bodies—something that the Conservatives changed when they were in government. 
 The provision in clause 4(5) that would enable the Auditor General to arrange for one or more members of his staff to audit a corporation's accounts—subject to appointment by a corporation—is consistent with clause 9, which provides for any function of the Auditor General to be exercised by a member of his staff if authorised by him, without any further caveat. In practice, the Auditor General would satisfy himself that any member of his staff would be suitably qualified to undertake the work. Auditors would have an appropriate qualification awarded by one of the bodies within the consultative committee of accountancy bodies. 
 Amendment No. 11 would delete the reference to construing clause 4 as one with other education legislation. The provision is essentially one of clarification and is common to education legislation. It enables definitions in other education legislation to be relied upon to clarify meaning. For instance, if there were uncertainty about whether an educational establishment were a higher education institution for the purpose of value-for-money studies, under the provision in clause 4, the definition of such an institution in the Further and Higher Education Act 1992—and the way in which the courts have interpreted that Act—would be relied upon for clarification. 
 The hon. Gentleman referred in particular to amendments Nos. 9 and 10, and I want to touch on one or two points that he made. As I have said, if educational bodies in Wales are brought into the Auditor General's statutory audit responsibilities in future, clause 3 would apply to those bodies, and he 
 would be able to conduct a forward-looking value-for-money study of that body at his own discretion. The clause offers a degree of flexibility: it allows for future change, if the Assembly were to decide that change was necessary to allow the Auditor General to extend his remit within further and higher education. On that basis, although this has been a short debate, I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

Bill Wiggin: I am grateful to the Minister for that reply. He was doing better before, but he is still on song. I do not feel quite as comfortable as I did earlier, although the points that he made after receiving a note do help somewhat. We have had a chance to air our worries, and that is about as constructive as we can hope to be, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5 - Studies relating to registered social landlords

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 14, in page 6, line 18, leave out from 'The' to 'one' and insert
'Auditor General for Wales may carry out'.

Win Griffiths: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
 No. 15, in clause 5, page 6, leave out lines 23 to 28 and insert— 
 '(2) The Auditor General for Wales may also carry out one or more programmes of studies as are mentioned in subsection (1) at the request of the Assembly provided that the Assembly agrees to make good the full cost incurred by him in undertaking the programme.'. 
No. 16, in clause 5, page 6, line 24, leave out from 'him' to the end of line 25. 
 No. 8, in clause 5, page 6, leave out lines 29 to 31. 
 No. 17, in clause 5, page 6, leave out lines 37 to 41. 
 No. 18, in clause 5, page 6, line 41, at end insert 
'and to an additional fine not exceeding £20 for each day on which the offence continues after he has been convicted of it.'. 
No. 19, in clause 5, page 6, line 41, at end insert— 
 '(7A) If a person is convicted of an offence under subsection (6) the Auditor General for Wales may recover from that person any expenses incurred by him in connection with proceedings for the offence.'.

Bill Wiggin: This is the largest group of amendments. Amendment Nos. 14 and 15 would ensure that the Auditor General could determine what studies he carried out on registered social landlords. As clause 5 stands, he is restricted to carrying out the studies that the Assembly wants, but we believe that he should determine his studies, as well as those where the Assembly has a concern. That is consistent with what we were questioning at the beginning of this morning's sitting: we want to ensure that no political imperative of the Assembly would influence his work, which would be totally inappropriate.
 Amendment no. 16 would delete the words ''on his behalf'' from subsection (2) of new clause 145C, in order to find out who would carry out studies on the 
 Auditor General's behalf, and under what power they would be appointed. The Auditor General should have complete independence in deciding what to examine. However, the Bill is not constructed in a way that would make financial audit and value-for-money audit of public money in Wales consistent and coherent. The Bill should be—although it is not—built on the principle of effective audit of public money in Wales. 
 Amendment No. 8 would delete subsection (4), which deals with value-for-money audits of registered social landlords are similar to those under subsection (3) of clause 4. If, while carrying out his studies, the Auditor General discovers that a body's objective is causing inefficiency or ineffectiveness, he should be able to question and report on its policy. Amendment No. 8 would ensure that he was free to do his work without being constrained by policy considerations. 
 Amendments Nos. 17 to 19 are designed to make the powers against non-compliance consistent throughout the public audit regime in Wales. Amendment No. 17 would remove subsections (6) and (7) from proposed new section 145C of the Government of Wales Act inserted by the clause, which would make it a criminal offence not to comply with the requirements concerning access to documents. That offence is punishable by a level 3 fine. That is not consistent with compliance under clause 11, which covers the Auditor General's rights of access to general information. That is why we tabled amendment No. 20, which we shall discuss later, and which, for consistency, would include such criminal offences in clause 11. 
 At present, the Bill states that it is a criminal offence if registered social landlords or local government are involved in non-compliance, but not otherwise. Can the Minister explain the logic behind that? Amendments Nos. 18 and 19 would also bring consistency into how the penalties are calculated, as they repeat the extended fining provisions of clauses 19 and 53. 
 We are striving to ensure that there is internal consistency in the Welsh public audit regime. We do not believe that criminal sanctions are necessary and would like assurances from the Minister that they are required. I have no doubt that the Minister will reply that the criminal sanctions in clause 5 must be retained because they are consistent with criminal law in England. However, the Assembly already has the power and, in clause 39, is given the ability to create criminal offences. Therefore, the basis of the Minister's probable reply—that the amendments would create inconsistency in criminal law between England and Wales—is false because, as soon as the Assembly uses its power under clause 39, that consistency will be lost. 
 If the Government concentrated on making the Bill consistent, Wales would have a far more logical audit regime. However, it seems that the Government do not want to change what already exists in England, and consequently are creating layers of complexity for Wales.

Don Touhig: This is the largest group of amendments, and I am sure that the debate on them will last for several hours. Perhaps not—[Laughter.] Colleagues did ask for some humour—I tried.
 Amendments Nos. 14 and 15 should be considered together. They would enable the Auditor General to undertake programmes of study in respect of registered social landlords in Wales at his discretion and independently of agreement with the Assembly. That is irrespective of the fact that he does not have a statutory audit function for registered social landlords. Hon. Members may already have seen the letter that I wrote to one of the Conservative members of the Committee after Second Reading.

Bill Wiggin: My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater (Mr. Liddell-Grainger).

Don Touhig: Yes, the hon. Member for Bridgwater. That letter might help to clarify some of those points.
 There are good reasons why agreement between the National Assembly and the Auditor General is the most effective way of progressing value-for-money studies in the sector. There are more than 100 registered social landlords in Wales. The Assembly provides £50 million a year in social housing grant to the sector. About 75 per cent. of registered social landlords do not at any one time receive funding from the National Assembly in respect of new building development. They meet their administration costs, including maintenance costs, from rental income and other sources, independently of the Assembly. The differing financial relationship of RSLs in relation to the Assembly should be taken into account in planning the participation in such value-for-money studies. 
 The Assembly has statutory responsibilities to fund and regulate the registered social landlord sector in Wales, which mirror those of the Housing Corporation in England. In particular, it must ensure that RSLs in Wales are financially viable, properly governed and properly managed. The exercise of those responsibilities includes the determination of standards of performance, the issue of guidance with respect to the management of housing, the approval of the constitutions and rules of RSLs and powers of intervention to ensure that regulatory requirements are complied with. 
 That work can inform positively the direction and emphasis of the programme of studies that can be agreed between the Auditor General and the Assembly. The programme agreed would complement and inform the Assembly's statutory responsibilities. Agreement would give focus and direction to studies in a sector in which the financial relationship between individual bodies and the Assembly differs. The Auditor General could undertake the RSLs' studies programme if, at some future stage, the Assembly, under clause 1, transferred to him, or asked him to exercise on its behalf, supervisory functions in respect of them. However, that would be a matter for the Assembly. 
 Amendment No. 16 would arguably require the Auditor General to undertake the programme of studies in respect of RSLs personally. He or she would 
 be a very busy person if that were the case. The wording that the amendment would delete makes it clear that the Auditor General has the discretion to arrange for the work to be undertaken by a member of his or her staff, or to be contracted out. The amendment could limit the Auditor General's operational flexibility and, potentially, the value for money obtained in undertaking the study programmes, particularly as the Auditor General will head a far larger organisation than exists currently and will assume wider responsibilities, such as those of an accounting officer, which we will come to discuss. Even if the programme of work were undertaken by a staff member or a private sector auditor contracted by the Auditor General for that purpose, he would still be responsible for the end result. For that reason, the amendment is unnecessary. 
 Amendment No. 8 would delete the prohibition in the clause on the Auditor General being able to question the merits of the policy objectives of a RSL while undertaking a programme of value-for-money studies agreed with the Assembly. We return to the principle that I referred to when speaking about amendment No. 7: the Auditor General cannot question the policy objectives of a body for which he has audit responsibilities. He may express a view on the way in which the body sets about achieving its objectives and whether its approach represents value for money, but questioning the merits of policy would compromise his independence. 
 Amendments Nos. 17 to 19 are related in that they are designed to show that the criminal penalties in the Bill should be rationalised. They would align the penalty for a failure to comply with a requirement of the Auditor General by a person connected with a RSL with the penalty that applies to a failure to comply in respect of a local government audit. The point has been made in the House of Commons and previously in debates in another place that the penalties attaching to certain provisions are not consistent. That charge was repeated by the hon. Member for Leominster this morning, and other amendments make the same point. 
 The principal objective of the Bill, in a busy parliamentary timetable, is to create a single audit framework in Wales. It does so effectively and has been widely welcomed. Indeed, the principles behind the Bill and its objectives have been greatly appreciated. I acknowledge that there is a divergence within the Bill with regard to criminal penalties. However, they reflect sanctions in other legislation, most notably the Audit Commission Act 1998. The purpose behind that, against the background of a criminal justice system for England and Wales, is that there should not be an undue difference in the penalties applying in England and Wales. From that standpoint, the Government are being consistent rather than inconsistent. 
 The level of the penalty in respect of RSLs in Wales is the same as that currently applying to the sector in England and Wales given similar circumstances. That is the appropriate approach. Should the penalties be subject to further review, that would be on a consistent England and Wales basis. From a practical 
 standpoint, I understand that the Audit Commission has indicated that it does not recall an instance when such criminal penalties have been invoked. 
 On amendment No. 14, the hon. Gentleman stated that the clause as currently drafted requires the Auditor General to undertake only such studies that the Assembly requires. It must be remembered that the Auditor General is not the statutory auditor for RSLs in Wales—a point made on Second Reading and reiterated in my letter to the hon. Member for Bridgwater. It must also be remembered that the programme of studies under the clause must be agreed with the Auditor General. Consequently, the Auditor General has a significant input to what studies should be taken forward in any programme. 
 The hon. Gentleman also touched on the fact that the Assembly may vary criminal sanctions under its secondary legislation powers. I acknowledge that where functions have been devolved to the Assembly—for example, on criminal offences— there is scope for divergence through secondary legislation. The provision in clause 39 for separate Welsh account and audit regulations currently made under the Audit Commission Act 1998 is an example, although the provisions in the respective England and Wales regulations are consistent in practice. That does not alter the Government's view on sanctions in primary legislation. 
 I am sure that we will return to the issue in a wider debate, perhaps on clause 54, but I hope that with those reassurances the hon. Gentleman will be happy to withdraw the amendment.

Bill Wiggin: The Minister has satisfied my curiosity on all the amendments except Nos.18 and 19, which, as he mentioned, are based on the consistency of criminal law between England and Wales. My concern, to which the Minister alluded, is that the Government have put the Bill together in a short parliamentary time, and that even although they have tried to ensure that the Bill is consistent with English law, that will be ultimately impossible because the Assembly has the power under clause 39 to make changes.
 I accept that the Government have done their best with what they have, but I believe that it is a missed opportunity. Such inconsistencies give the impression of a rushed job, which is a shame. I know that the Government are determined to give the National Assembly everything that it asks for as quickly as possible, which is consistent with what they have always said. However, the measure in question is a mistake, and I urge the Government to reconsider these matters before the Bill reaches the statute book. 
 Little would be gained by pursuing the amendments now, so I will not do that. It would also be wrong in the spirit of our constructive discussions this morning to push for a vote. The Minister made a valuable point when he said that Conservatives Members broadly welcome the Bill, and I take this opportunity to emphasise that. The purpose of the Committee is to iron out any wrinkles. I believe that the issue of consistency is a little wrinkle, and the Minister 
 probably recognises that too. The difference is that he is prepared to let it go, so under the circumstances I am too. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 6 to 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10 - Accounting officer

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 45, in page 9, line 18, at end insert
'for no more than three months'.
 The amendment is based on discussions in another place about why the clause is worded as it is. It is a probing amendment to ascertain how long the office of the Auditor General could be left vacant or how long the post could be filled by a temporary replacement, while the Auditor General is incapable of discharging his duties, before the temporary appointee becomes permanent, and is therefore appointed by the Crown as opposed to the Audit Commission. There is a need to specify a time scale in the Auditor General's absence, and that is the sole purpose of the amendment. Three months is an acceptable period, but that may not fit in with the Government's views. However, instead of opposing my amendment, I hope that they will recognise its value and that if they are not happy with the time frame of three months, they will change it.

Don Touhig: The amendment would limit to three months the period for which the Audit Committee may designate a member of the Auditor General's staff as the Wales Audit Office's temporary accounting officer. That is an arbitrary and inappropriate time limit. The Bill makes provision designating the Auditor General as the accounting officer for Wales for the Wales Audit Office. The consequence of such an amendment would be that if the post of Auditor General became vacant, or the Auditor General was incapacitated for more than three months, the Audit Committee would have to consider alternative arrangements with a view to making a fresh temporary appointment.
 Under existing accountancy officer conventions for England and Wales, arrangements are made for designating an acting accounting officer if the accounting officer is incapacitated for four weeks or more. There is no reason to suppose that similar arrangements will not apply in the Wales Audit Office. If an acting accounting officer is competent to perform the duties, there is no reason why he or she should not continue them until the appointment of a new Auditor General or until his or her return to work. The amendment would also create an inconsistency with other statutory arrangements for the designation of acting accounting officers—for example, in respect of the Welsh Administration ombudsman under the 
 Government of Wales Act 1998. I hope that the hon. Gentleman finds that helpful, and that he will therefore ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Bill Wiggin: The amendment makes the point that if we take the Auditor General seriously, we need to know how long Wales can cope without one. We suggested three months for a temporary Auditor General. I accept the Minister's criticism that that is an arbitrary time, which it is, but as I said earlier, we take the Bill, which we support, seriously. It is an important change in the law. By tabling the amendment we hope to ascertain how long the Government feel the gap should be left open or filled by a temporary or designated member of staff. In order to give the Auditor General the credibility that he deserves, we should know how for long he can be incapacitated before his important role is permanently filled. I accept that some flexibility could be built into the wording; that is what the amendment is designed to probe. I hope that the Minister will say how long the gap can be left open or whether another body should have the ability to decide on the period. It is important not to leave the office of Auditor General potentially unfilled by a permanent appointment for an unspecified period.

Don Touhig: The hon. Gentleman referred to appointment by the Crown rather than by the Audit Commission. The current provision allows a temporary accounting officer to be appointed by the Audit Committee, not the Crown or the Audit Commission. As I said, under existing accountancy conventions for England and Wales, arrangements are made for designating an acting accounting officer if the accounting officer is incapacitated for four weeks or more. How long that would continue would be at the Audit Committee's discretion, and his terms and conditions of appointment would be part of that; for example, there would be statutory sick leave. We are keen not to tie anyone's hands by having a fixed and arbitrary period of three months, as suggested by the amendment. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will recognise that within four weeks steps would be taken and terms and conditions on the appointment would kick in and affect the length of time that a person might be permitted to be away before further action had to be taken.

Bill Wiggin: As I now understand it, there will be a four-week period during which the Auditor General might be a bit iffy. Thereafter the role would be filled by a temporary appointment. Obviously we would have to wait to ascertain the nature of his discomfort or inability. I am grateful to the Minister for mentioning that this eventuality would be written into his contract. I agree that the amendment does not attempt to tie people's hands. The Minister's replies have made me feel far more comfortable about the nature of the Bill. Anyone who wonders how long the Auditor General can be absent will need to know the nature of his terms and conditions. I doubt whether they will be privy to them, but at least we know that
 that will be taken into account. That is all we sought to do with the amendment. I am delighted with the Minister's reply. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11 - Access to information, etc by Auditor General

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 20, in page 11, line 4, at end insert—
 '(6A) A person commits an offence if without reasonable excuse he fails to comply with a requirement imposed under this section.
 (6B) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (4A) is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.'.
 Amendment No. 20 is an alternative to amendments Nos. 17 to 19, which seeks to bring consistency to clauses 5 and 11 with regard to criminal sanctions. It would add a criminal offence for non-compliance with the Auditor General's right of access to general information, to make it consistent with the criminal sanctions in clause 5. I repeat that we do not believe that criminal sanctions are necessary, but the amendment is an attempt to highlight the inconsistencies in the Bill and to try to resolve them. If the Government think that criminal sanctions are necessary for non-compliance by registered social landlords or local government in clause 5, why is it not a criminal offence in clause 11?

Don Touhig: Amendment No. 20 would apply criminal sanctions to non-compliance with clause 11 access rights. This would apply to persons connected with the National Assembly, its sponsored public bodies, NHS bodies in Wales and other public bodies funded by the Assembly. These bodies are covered by accounting officer conventions. It would also apply to those who hold documents and information relating to the exercise of the Auditor General's functions in relation to bodies such as the Assembly-sponsored public bodies and health bodies in Wales. In the first instance the matter would be brought to the attention of the relevant body's accounting officer and then the National Assembly's Audit Committee.
 The Committee would be able to call witnesses to seek an explanation. The Committee could issue and publish a report on the matter. The principal accounting officer of the National Assembly and the accounting officers of other public bodies in Wales are also required to give evidence to the Public Accounts Committee, if invited. Ultimately, an instance of non-compliance could result in the removal of accounting officer status. Withdrawal of that status could well result in the individual concerned not being able to continue in his or her job. There are no equivalent accounting officer conventions in the local government sector. 
 I am not aware of any instance in Wales where the imposition of criminal sanctions would have led to any more satisfactory resolution of access difficulties in the 
 context of clause 11 bodies. Criminal sanction provisions were not incorporated in the Auditor General's original access rights provision in the Government of Wales Act 1998. Lord Sharman also did not recommend the creation of criminal offence provisions in this context in his report. The Government are satisfied that the extended rights of access to documents and information under clause 11 could be secured either under the accounting officer conventions or by way of an application for judicial review. 
 In judicial review proceedings, where available, the Auditor General could seek a mandatory order, compelling the person, persons or body to comply. Alternatively, he could apply in the civil courts for a mandatory injunction to compel the performance of a duty to provide access. We consider those potential remedies to be formidable. For instance, a subcontractor would think twice about refusing to comply with the Auditor General's rights of access if faced with the prospects of litigation and the costs that would inevitably ensue. On that basis, the Government consider that it would not be appropriate or necessary to apply criminal sanctions in respect of the provisions of clause 11, which would create a criminal offence that would not exist in England. We have again sought a degree of consistency, recognising that there were differences in the earlier debate, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will be satisfied with that.

Bill Wiggin: I should like to be satisfied, but the truth remains that if everything that the Minister says is right, why is it necessary to apply it to social landlords or local government? There is an inconsistency here: we either need criminal sanctions or we do not. I would expect a judicial review to be a long and difficult process, so it makes it much easier to have, if necessary, criminal sanctions throughout the Bill, or not.
 At present, there is a difference between social landlords and local government, and the amendment. That is the problem that the Government face, and I do not think that the Minister answered that. He must understand why I am concerned about this, and unless he receives any divine inspiration, it will be difficult for him to answer the point. It is important to be consistent in legislation. Many Members have turned up this morning to contribute to our debates, and they would want, just as much as I do, a consistent Bill for the people of Wales, not different rules for different people according to how they are pigeonholed. I am not at all happy with the Minister's reply at this stage.

Don Touhig: I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman is not happy— [Interruption.] I am mortified. It will keep me awake for most of the night. I point out to him that in a later debate, which I do not want to anticipate, he will be arguing against criminal sanctions. The Opposition should exercise a degree of consistency as well. In my response to him, I sought to point out a number of provisions that will be in place in order effectively to deal with his problems, short of applying criminal sanctions. I am sure that in our later
 debate, we shall hear much about the need not to have criminal sanctions in respect of other matters to be considered by the Committee. On that basis, I hope that he is prepared to accept the points that I have made.

Bill Wiggin: I take the Minister's point about criminal sanctions. I think that I emphasised enough that I do not believe that criminal sanctions are necessary. On that basis, I should like to see them removed for the other classes. We are not going to agree on this, and I want to make progress. It is an important Bill, but this is another of those little wrinkles that need to be ironed out, and we are doing our best to do so.

Don Touhig: We have talked today about the Second Reading debate in the other place, which helped to improve the Bill. I point out to the hon. Gentleman that one of his colleagues in the other place regarded criminal sanctions as a blunt instrument. Why should we want to extend them?

Bill Wiggin: I do not mind if we remove criminal sanctions from the Bill, but the problem is the inconsistency. Either they are good for registered social landlords and local government employees, or they are not. That is the sticking point for the Committee. I have sought to remove them, I have sought to put them back in, and I shall probably seek again to take them out, because I am not going to let the Minister, with such an inconsistency—[Interruption.] The Minister is accusing me, from a sedentary position, of being like a Liberal Democrat. That is something that would give some people a sleepless night; what a very low and dirty insult that must be, and I am deeply hurt.
 I was about to withdraw my amendment, but I shall now push it to a vote on the basis of that rotten insult. No, Mr. Griffiths, I am joking, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12 - Local government bodies in Wales

Don Touhig: I beg to move amendment No. 47, in page 11, line 38, leave out paragraph (g) and insert—
'(g) a fire and rescue authority in Wales constituted by a scheme under section 2 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 or a scheme to which section 4 of that Act applies;'.

Win Griffiths: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 49 and 54.

Don Touhig: I shall be brief in speaking to these amendments, which take account of the effect of the Fire and Rescue Services Bill on this Bill. The Fire and Rescue Services Bill will replace fire authorities with fire and rescue authorities. The amendments will change the three relevant references in the Bill in clauses 12 and 46 and schedule 1. The Fire and Rescue
 Services Bill has completed its passage through the House. Consideration on Report in another place in scheduled for early July and the debate on Third Reading will take place before the end of July. There is a reasonable expectation that it will receive Royal Assent in this parliamentary Session, so I hope that the Committee will allow the amendments to stand.
 Amendment agreed to.

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 3, in clause 12, page 12, line 7, leave out 'or substantially'.
 Our discussions on this amendment should be quick because it deals with a subject that we have already covered. I am glad that the Committee has been proceeding with a degree of humour—who says that audit is humourless? Amendment No. 3 would delete from clause 12(3)(b) the words ''or substantially'', which also appear in clause 1(2)(b). The phrase ''substantially funded'' is too vague and has a wide-ranging interpretation. What exactly is meant by 
''substantially funded from public money''? 
Will the Minister clarify what private sector bodies might be included under paragraph (b) as being substantially funded from public money? I know that he dealt with that question earlier, but this is an important subject and I am sure that he will clarify the situation for anyone with doubts over what ''substantially'' adds to the Bill.

Don Touhig: The amendment also deals with the definition of ''public body'' in the context of enabling the National Assembly by order to amend the categories of body defined as local government bodies in Wales to take account of future circumstances. The definition used in clause 12 is consistent with that used in clause 1, which we considered earlier. Again, the amendment could have an unnecessarily restrictive effect.
 The purpose of the definition in clause 12, and the rest of the Bill, is to maximise the scrutiny and safeguards in respect of the use of public money. The amendment would undermine that intention. It would mean that a category of body wholly funded by public money could be added to clause 12(1), but a category of body that derived anything less than 100 per cent. of its funding from the public purse could not. 
 As I emphasised earlier, many public bodies do not receive all their funding from a public source. For example, a body could not be added to clause 12(1) if it raised a proportion of its funding from income derived from the provision of services. In that case, the body could not be added unless it was clearly carrying out public functions. Income derived from fees or leisure-related receipts, such as theatre tickets or leisure centre admissions, would not count as public funding if the amendment was accepted. With that explanation, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will reflect further and withdraw the amendment.

Bill Wiggin: Indeed. I am grateful to the Minister for that reply and, as I hinted earlier, I suspected that that would be the case. Having reflected further, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 12, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 13 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14 - Appointment of auditors

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 23, in
clause 14, page 12, line 23, leave out subsection (3).

Win Griffiths: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 25, in
clause 14, page 12, line 30, leave out subsection (5). 
No. 24, in 
clause 14, page 12, line 35, leave out subsection (6).

Bill Wiggin: I hope that the Minister will not again accuse me of belonging to some dodgy party.

Roger Williams: On a point of order, Mr. Griffiths. I am not sure that that term is appropriate to parliamentary procedure.

Win Griffiths: We will reflect on that.

Bill Wiggin: Indeed. I think that I was very kind to the Minister, as were you, Mr. Griffiths.
 Amendment No. 23 would delete subsection (3) of clause 14 and enable the Auditor General to audit local authorities, as he does with public bodies under part 1. He should not be prohibited from doing so, as proposed in subsection (3). That is why we seek to delete that subsection. 
 Why is there special treatment for local authorities, which are also substantially funded by central Government through the Assembly? Why have not all public sector bodies been placed on the same footing in the Bill with respect to the appointment of auditors? If that has happened in NHS auditing, which creates a new model for Wales, why not for local authorities? That is another reason why the Minister cannot use the principle of consistency with England, as the Bill creates an inconsistency in relation to NHS audits. If he claims that there would be a conflict of interest in auditing local authority bodies, surely there is a conflict of interest in the Auditor General auditing NHS bodies too. 
 On Second Reading, the Minister argued that local authorities are different because they are democratically elected. Can he explain why that is a legitimate argument for ruling out the Auditor General for Wales being able to appoint himself? If the situation requires an even hand, who better to apply that than the Auditor General? 
 Amendment No. 24, which is probing, would delete subsection (6), under which the Auditor General is required to consult the local authority before appointing an external auditor. The amendment's 
 purpose is to discover why the Auditor General has to consult the local authority in the first place and what would happen if it were to refuse his recommendation. 
 Amendment No. 25 would delete the power in subsection (5) of joint audit appointments. There are potential problems with joint audits, such as duplication and cost. There is also the risk of omission when things escape audit. Joint audits are not the norm in the private sector for those reasons. Again, provisions have been lifted from the Audit Commission Act 1998, but I believe that they are unnecessary.

Don Touhig: Amendment No. 23 would enable the Auditor General to appoint himself in a personal capacity as the auditor of a local government body. A key objective of the Bill, which we discussed on Second Reading, is the preservation of the constitutional independence of local government in the new audit arrangements. The prohibition on the Auditor General appointing himself in a personal capacity is a key safeguard in ensuring that that is achieved.
 Local government raises a significant proportion of its revenue from the local electorate to whom it is accountable. That has relevance to the position of an appointed auditor, who has specific responsibilities to the electors of a government body as well as the body itself. 
 The Bill preserves the right of a local government elector to inspect and copy a local government body's statement of accounts. The appointed auditor is under a duty to give an elector or a representative an opportunity to question him or her about the accounts and to make objections in respect of them. An elector may, for instance, request the auditor to declare an item of account unlawful. The auditor is under a duty to consider any such objection and to notify the objector formally of his or her decision. 
 In undertaking those duties, it is essential that an auditor should be impartial and, just as importantly, be perceived to be impartial both by the local government body and the electors whom it serves. The avoidance of any potential for a conflict of interest arising—for instance, from the exercise of other statutory responsibilities—is essential. 
 The Auditor General is the statutory auditor of the National Assembly and bodies directly accountable to the Assembly. The Assembly provides most funding for local government in Wales. If the Auditor General appointed himself or herself as auditor to individual local authorities in those circumstances, the distinctness of local government's constitutional and democratic independence would be seen to have been lost. 
 In practical terms, an important function of the Auditor General under the new arrangements will be to monitor the performance of auditors that he or she appoints to local government bodies, and to consider complaints that may be made against them. However, that important control would not be available if the Auditor General appointed himself or herself as auditor in a personal capacity. The Auditor General will also be responsible under clause 20 for setting a scale of fees and charges for the audit of local 
 government bodies, from which he would derive benefit. He will also be responsible under clause 16 for preparing and issuing a code of audit practice, to which he would have to adhere. I hope that I have persuaded the hon. Gentleman to reflect further on amendment No. 23. 
 Amendment No. 25 appears to be designed to deprive the Auditor General of the discretion available to the Audit Commission to make a joint audit appointment. The Audit Commission will retain the discretion in England should the Bill be enacted, but the amendment would therefore limit the Auditor General's powers in comparison. Dual appointments, although not common, are relevant if specific skills not possessed by the initially appointed auditor are needed for particularly complex audits, or if a form of peer review is undertaken during an audit. 
 The infrequent use of the power does not detract from its potential value. As I have said in other contexts, the financial accountability environment in which auditors operate is becoming increasingly complex. We touched on that issue on Second Reading. It would not be appropriate to deprive the Auditor General of the flexibility that this power will give him to meet future needs. 
 Under amendment No. 24, the Auditor General would no longer need to consult a local government body on the appointment of its auditor. On Second Reading, I said that an audit watchdog could also be a client body's best friend. The serious point behind that remark is that the relationship between auditor and audited is, and should be, far more constructive than stereotypes sometimes convey. In an increasingly complex financial environment, the auditor is a source of valuable advice, reassurance and help on matters such as accounting systems and risk management, which is changing the whole way in which audit works. 
 The 2004 general report of the Auditor General for Wales refers to examples of advice sought and given to clients. High standards of financial accountability are achieved through such a positive, proactive relationship. Withdrawing the right of a local government body to be consulted on the appointment of its auditor would risk undermining the basis for a positive working relationship, and financial accountability standards could suffer as a result. I hope that, with those explanations, the hon. Gentleman feels able to withdraw the amendment.

Bill Wiggin: The Minister's approach to amendment No. 23 is laudable, and I am grateful to him. It was far from clear, certainly to me, that the accountability of a local government audit would clash with the accountability of the Auditor General. However, the Minister made that clear, which satisfies me that we must have the right reporting functions working as he outlined.
 The Minister also dealt with amendment No. 25 effectively. I have no wish to see duplication of costs and certain elements perhaps falling between two separate audits. However, his point about not tying the Auditor General's hands is a good one and I have no difficulty in not pressing that amendment to a vote. 
 On amendment No. 24, I would be grateful if the Minister told us what would happen if a local authority refused the Auditor General's recommendations. Until he does so, I am unable to say that I will not press it. I hope that he replies to that point.

Don Touhig: I tried to make it clear when I responded to the hon. Gentleman on amendment No. 24 that it is important for a good working relationship between the Auditor General and local government that there should be consultation about the appointment—

Bill Wiggin: I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I absolutely agree with him that in normal circumstances there would be no reason for a local authority to refuse the Auditor General's recommendation. However, given the purpose of the measure and the safeguards built into it, the only time it will be needed is when a local authority is up to something that it may later regret, and therefore it may wish to delay things by refusing the Auditor General's recommendation. I am pressing the Minister because I want to find out what would happen in those circumstances.

Don Touhig: I am most grateful for the hon. Gentleman's intervention. It has enabled me to give an answer that might satisfy him. I was talking about a consultation; the Auditor General will continue to appoint the auditor if there is no good reason not to do so. It is a consultation, and at the end of the day the power will be with the Auditor General to appoint the auditor.

Bill Wiggin: What a tremendous response; it was just what we needed. I thank the Minister very much for his reply, which deals admirably with the whole issue. Conservative Members support the Bill; we are just trying to iron out the wrinkles. With great pleasure, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15 - Persons to assist auditors

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill. 
 Mr. Wiggin: We would prefer that clause 15 did not stand part of the Bill. There is another clause that deals with those who are approved to help the auditors, and clause 15 is less precise. Therefore, by proposing that it is deleted, we are probing the Government about why it is necessary to have a general type of person to assist auditors. It is a small question, but I hope that the Minister will be able to throw some light on the matter.

Don Touhig: Clause 15 is an important practical provision. If it were not to stand part of the Bill, the Auditor General would be unable to approve arrangements for one or more persons to assist an auditor appointed to a local Government body in the exercise of his or her functions. The clause would enable an appointed auditor to seek assistance in the exercise of those duties on matters that may be of significant complexity, such as taxation or the interrogation of complex information databases. It would also enable the Auditor General to oversee such arrangements.
 A newly appointed auditor would benefit from having the assistance of an outgoing auditor in respect of a specific ongoing aspect of an audit brief, such as a criminal investigation. Under the present arrangements, the Audit Commission has standing guidance on approval arrangements, which include those for the delegation of an auditor's functions under such arrangements, although the guidance makes it clear that the delegation arrangements do not diminish the ultimate responsibility of the audit supplier appointed by the commission. 
 The delegation arrangements specify the level below which the audit functions may not be delegated. Decisions on delegations are taken personally by the district auditor or the partner-director of any other appointed auditor. It would be open to the Auditor General to adopt these or similar arrangements. 
 If clause 15 were to be deleted, it would significantly hamper an appointed auditor in Wales who may need specialist support in the exercise of his or her functions. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will recognise the value of such support.

Bill Wiggin: I was going to ask the Minister why this should not be part of new section 96C of the Government of Wales Act 1998, as inserted by clause 2. However, I may have missed the suggestion in the clause that the people in question will be of a specialist nature, with expertise that may not include auditing. I recognise that as business has become more complex, such people would be necessary. I am grateful to the Minister for his reply, which satisfies my curiosity about the clause.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16 - Code of audit practice

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 27, in page 13, line 25, leave out subsection (4).

Win Griffiths: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 28, in clause 16, page 13, line 33, leave out subsection (7).

Bill Wiggin: This is a busy morning for some of us. In speaking to amendment No. 27, I shall include amendment No. 28. They are probing amendments concerning the audit practice code in clause 16.
 Amendment No. 27 seeks to delete subsection (4) in order to ascertain the Assembly's role in relation to the audit practice code. Before the Assembly gives its approval, can it amend the code? If it could, that would undermine the Auditor General's authority.
 Amendment No. 28 removes subsection (7), because even after the code has been issued by the Auditor General, and has been approved by the Assembly, either House of Parliament can annul the code by statutory instrument. Can the Minister explain why that power is included, and in what circumstances it might be used?

Don Touhig: The amendment would remove the National Assembly's ability to approve a draft code of practice for the audit of local government bodies in Wales before its introduction by the Auditor General. The code would incorporate best professional practice with respect to standards, procedures and techniques to be adopted by auditors in the exercise of their functions. The provision enabling the Assembly to approve the code has been incorporated in the Bill as a result of representations made during pre-legislative scrutiny and public consultation on the draft Bill. Preliminary work is already under way by the National Audit Office in Wales and the Audit Commission in Wales in the preparation of such a code.
 Similarly, amendment No. 28 would remove the ability of either House of Parliament to annul the draft code by negative resolution procedures. The provision for parliamentary consideration of the draft code was also included in the Bill in response to views expressed during consultation. Under the provisions of section 4 of the Audit Commission Act 1998, the express approval of Parliament is required in relation to the existing code of audit practice in England and Wales. It is appropriate that a code of practice discrete to Wales should be approved by the Assembly and, should it wish to do so, Parliament should also have the opportunity to scrutinise the code and comment on it. 
 Very significant sums of taxpayers' money fund local government services in Wales, and it is right that there should be an opportunity for democratic scrutiny of the way in which local government bodies are to be audited. That does not compromise the Auditor General's independence, because neither the Assembly nor Parliament would have the right to modify the code. In the very unlikely circumstances of the draft code not being approved, it would be referred to the Auditor General for further consideration. I think that I have answered the hon. Gentleman's specific point: the Assembly would not have the power to amend the code.

Bill Wiggin: I am grateful to the Minister for his reply. The concern is that the Auditor General could be undermined by tweaking by the Assembly. The Minister has made it clear that that will not happen, and I am grateful for that, but in the negotiations during the preparation of the draft code, which would be laid before the Assembly, such a problem could exist. Clearly, the Assembly must have a say over the code, as it will have to live by it. Equally, the Minister
 will recognise my concerns that during the negotiation phase of any code before it was laid before the Assembly, there could be a similar problem. The same argument applies to the parliamentary element here: it is important that Parliament retains the power to annul the code by statutory instrument. I do not think that it ever will, but I recognise the value of leaving the provision in the Bill. We have expressed our concern about untoward behaviour taking place during the negotiations. I am sure, however, that that will never happen. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 17 to 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24 - Consideration of reports in public interest

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 29, in page 18, line 4, leave out from 'are' to end of line 8 and insert
'those listed in section 12(1)'.

Win Griffiths: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 30, in clause 25, page 18, line 37, leave out subsection (3).

Bill Wiggin: We tabled the amendments to ask why there are various lists of bodies in the Bill. Amendment No. 29 would delete the four bodies that are listed in clause 25(3) and replace them with the nine bodies that are listed in clause 12(1). Amendment No. 30 seeks to delete clause 25(3) because we wish to establish why the four types of bodies receive different treatment. These have all doubtlessly been copied from existing legislation, which again highlights the wasted opportunity to consider the audit regime in Wales afresh. I look forward to hearing why those four have been picked out.

Don Touhig: Amendment No. 29, by requiring all local government bodies to consider reports as soon as practicable, would relax the requirement on the larger bodies. There would be no specific deadline, either of one month or any longer period by which they would be required to consider reports. That would be a retrograde step. The one-month deadline for the larger bodies is also consistent with the tighter time scale introduced on an England and Wales basis by the Local Government Act 2003. It reduced the time scale for consideration from four months.
 Furthermore, the safeguards provided by clauses 25 and 26 are dependent on the distinction between the larger bodies subject to the one-month deadline and the smaller bodies. If the amendment were agreed to and the distinction were removed, the safeguards in clauses 25 and 26 would cease to apply. Those clauses require the larger local government bodies to make specific decisions in response to a public interest report 
 within a definite time scale, and require minimum publicity for a meeting to consider the report and its subject matter.

Bill Wiggin: I can see where the Minister is taking the argument about the sizes of bodies. Does he not feel that local authorities should perhaps have been included in that list of four?

Don Touhig: I shall return to that point in a moment.
 The requirements set out in clause 24 as drafted make robust and pragmatic arrangements for the consideration of reports in the public interest. Amendment No. 30 would have the opposite effect, by imposing on the smaller bodies a definite timetable and process for considering certain written recommendations from their auditors. The fact that the smaller local government bodies are not currently subject to such requirements recognises their comparatively small administrative resource base and the fact that they meet with less frequency. I hope that that covers the point that particularly concerned the hon. Gentleman and that he will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Bill Wiggin: I am not sure, because I do not know the intimate details, whether an internal drainage board is larger or smaller than a local authority in Wales. I suspect that they are different in every case. Like most things in life there is no set of rules. The Minister's point that smaller bodies should not be under the same pressure as larger ones is a good one. I am not sure that we should be so generous in the Bill, but if that is what the Minister wants, there may be a better way of doing it. I am not suggesting that my amendments are perfect, but if the size of the body and the frequency with which it meets are the issues, we should perhaps specify those factors and force it to report in the way that the Minister has outlined.
 In drafting the Bill, the Minister has obviously considered how things are today, but hon. Members will agree that we must think of most eventualities. I am not sure that he has done that. I would be grateful if the Minister could put my mind at rest. I am concerned that the size of the body and the frequency with which it meets are the only issues, because organisations such as police authorities, which are very important to people, should be as accountable as humanly possible. That is what we are trying to dig at.

Don Touhig: The hon. Gentleman asked why there are various lists of bodies in clauses 24 and 25, but there are only two lists. One set of bodies is larger and better resourced and tends to meet more frequently. I should also stress that local authorities are subject to more demanding requirements in the Bill, and we are following the right route on that. The other list is of smaller bodies. I hope that that explanation addresses the hon. Gentleman's concern about the difference in sizes.

Bill Wiggin: I am grateful for that reply, and it mollifies my concerns. We want to make progress this morning, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 25 to 27 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28 - Additional publicity for non-immediate reports

Don Touhig: I beg to move amendment No. 48, in clause 28, page 21, line 16, leave out 'body' and insert 'auditor'.
 The amendment corrects a minor error in clause 28. Subsection (3)(b) enables a member of the public to obtain, on payment of a reasonable sum, a copy of a non-immediate public interest report prepared by an auditor under clause 22 in respect of an audited body's accounts. It states that a copy of the report should be supplied by the audited body, but the reference should be to the body's auditors. The amendment corrects that mistake, and I commend it to the Committee. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Clause 28, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 29 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 30 - Inspection of documents and questions at audit

Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 32, in page 22, line 4, leave out 'an interested' and insert 'a'.

Win Griffiths: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 33, in clause 30, page 22, line 19, leave out 'means' and insert 
'includes but is not limited to'.

Bill Wiggin: The amendments deal with inspection rights during audits of local government bodies. Subsection (1) allows the accounts that are to be audited to be inspected by ''an interested person''. Amendment No. 32 proposes the replacement of that phrase with ''a person'' to find out what the Government mean by ''an interested person''. Clause 30 sets out the fact that the rights of information and documents do not apply to personal information, which is defined restrictively in subsection (4). Amendment No. 33 would widen the definition of personal information from just the fact that the person is employed and/or paid by the body.
 I want to probe whether the clause has been drafted adequately to set out clearly what information people are restricted to obtaining. It is also interesting that the Bill makes no reference to the Data Protection Act 
 1998, which presumably covers all rights to information. Will the Minister explain why the clause has been so drafted?

Don Touhig: Amendment No. 32 would widen the scope of the category of person entitled to inspect or copy the accounts and related documents of a local government body. If the amendment were to be accepted, a person would not need to be interested in the sense of having a practical interest in the accounts or affairs of the body concerned—for example, he would not have to be a local taxpayer, a resident or a person with a commercial interest in the affairs of the body audited. A body would have to accommodate anyone who wished to inspect and take copies.
 The clause enables interested persons to inspect or make copies of documents relating to the accounts at an audit or of a local government body. It also gives a local government elector or his representative the right to question the auditor about the accounts. In practice, the reference to an interested person is very unlikely to represent a practical impediment to a person wishing to exercise a reasonable right of inspection. The terminology, however, entitles a local government body or auditor to resist any vexatious or frivolous requests. 
 Amendment No. 33 would widen the definition of personal information that a person is not entitled to obtain through inspection of the accounts or related documents, or questions to an auditor. The amendment is ambiguous, as, unlike the clause, it does not clarify or define the limits of what constitutes personal information; it could lead to confusion and misunderstanding. Much of what a lay person would consider personal information is protected by the Data Protection Act. Additional protection by third parties is not necessary in the context of the Bill. 
 I hope that the hon. Gentleman finds my response helpful and that he will consider withdrawing the amendment.

Bill Wiggin: I always find the Minister's responses helpful, and that is especially so of the second part. I agree that my amendment may not necessarily involve the best possible drafting, but the situation is unusual and I would have thought that the Data Protection Act offered such protection.
 The only question on which I want to press the Minister is that of ''an interested person''. The first people who spring to mind are journalists and those in the media. They may be fascinated by the matter, but they may not qualify as ''an interested person''. I am surprised that he will not accept my amendment, as I am often told that transparency is the key thing that we should seek in legislation. However, his point about vexatious, difficult and perhaps even frivolous requests is important, particularly as those are increasing in modern life. I would be grateful if he clarified the status of the media in this respect.

Don Touhig: Many of us are subject to frivolous requests from time to time. Someone whom I do not know, and who is not one of my constituents, comes to the House every other year. He puts in a green card, giving the reason for his visit as ''tea''. There we are—we get some odd requests.

Bill Wiggin: I get the same request from my dad.

Don Touhig: The hon. Gentleman is concerned with what is meant by ''an interested person''. There have been only a handful of cases dealing with that meaning. A recent High Court case confirmed that the motive of the person seeking the information is irrelevant. That is important. The media are not considered interested by virtue of their being media, which was also confirmed in a recent case. That High Court indication is a significant contribution to the wider debate.

Bill Wiggin: I expect we will read in the newspaper I quoted earlier that that means that the media are banned from finding out what local authorities are doing. I take the Minister's serious point; he has clarified who could and could not see the accounts. I am sure that the media will be able to find an elector to help them, so they will not be blocked, but it is important to clarify the situation at this stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. 
 Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock.